作为生产力增长来源的产业间和产业内转换：芬兰信息和通信技术产业的结构变化（英）-2023_市场营销策.docx

Inter-industryandintra-industryswitchingassourcesofproductivitygrowth:structuralchangeofFinland,sICTindustriesNataliaKuosmanenG Timo KUoSmanen timo.kuosmanenutu.fl ETLA Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland Department of Economics, Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, Turku, FinlandPublished online: 21 NCVemher 2023TimoKuosmanen?Accepted:2November2023©TheAuthor(s)2023AbstractStructuralchangei$animportantdriverofproductivitygrowthattheaggregatelevel.WhilepreviousPrOdUCIiVitydecompositionsaccountforthecontributionsofmarketentryandexit,theyoverlookcontinuingfirmsthatswitchfromoneindustrytoanother.Wedevelopanimprovedproductivitydecompositionthataccountsforbothintra-industryandinterindustryswitching,isapplicabletobothstaticandinter-temporalsettings,andensuresconsistentaggregationoffirm-levelproductivitytotheindustrylevel.TheproposeddecompositionisappliedtoFinland'sinformationandcommunicationtechnology(ICT)industryinthefirsttwodecadesofthe21stcentury.ThisindustryexperiencedmajorstructuralchangesduetotherapiddownfallofNokia,theworld'slargestmobilephonemanufactureratthebeginningofourstudyperiod.Ourresultsrevealthatthesharpdeclineoflaborproductivitywasassociatedwithstructuralchanges,whereasthesurvivingfirmsthatcontinuedinthesameindustrymanagedtoimprovetheirproductivity.Ourresultsindicatethatindustryswitchingcandampenorenhancetheproductivityimpactsofstructuralchange,especiallyduringtimesofcrisisandrecession.KeywordsEntryandexitLaborproductivity-ProductswitchingReallocationofresourcesJELclassificationD24L160471IntroductionSchumpeter(1939)coinedthetermwcreativedestruction"todescribehowmarketcompetitionleadstothecontinuousreplacementofinefficientproducerswithmoreproductiveones.Healsonotedthatduringrecessions,theleastproductiveandleastinnovativeunitsaremorelikelytobescrapped,whichcanhelptoincreaseproductivityandfosternewgrowth.However,thetraditionalapproachofmeasuringproductivitygrowthusingbalancedpaneldataofcontinuingfirmsignorestheimpactofstructuralchangethroughentryandexitonproductivitygrowth(TheuseofbalancedpanelsoffirmsinMalmquistproductivitydecompositionsremainscommontoday,withrecentexamplesincludingBansaletal.(2022),Laporseketal.(2022),andLiandGuan(2022),amongothers).Bailyetal.(1992)andGrilichesandRegev(1995)werethefirsttointroducestructuralchangedecompositionsofproductivitygrowththatconsiderednotonlythecontinuingfirmsbutalsothecontributionsoffirmentryandexit.FollowingOlleyandPakes(1996),anotherlineofstudiesdistinguishesthecontributionofresourcereallocationacrossfirms,whichisalsorelatedtocreativedestruction.CompetitionfavorsHighproductivityfirms,whichtendtogrowlargerthanIowproductivityfirms.NotethatthemarketshareofaIowproductivityfirmmayinitiallyshrinkandeventuallyreachzero,resultinginamarketexit.Severalsubsequentstudies,suchasMaliranta(2003),BockermanandMaliranta(2(X)7),D沁WertandFox(20()9),HyytinenandMaliranta(2013),Holm(2014),MelitzandPolanec(2015),andMalirantaandMiiattanen(2015)haveextendedtheOlley-Pakesproductivitydecompositiontoincorporateentryandexit.Inpreviousproductivitydecompositionscitedabove,firmsareclassifiedintomutuallyexclusivegroupsofcontinuingfirms,exitingfirms,andnewentrants.ConventionaltheoreticalfoundationforthestructuralchangedecompositionsofproductivitytobeintroducedinSection3.Dynamicmodelsofoligopolythatinco>ratesunkentrycosts,stochastictechnologicalprogress,andendogenousexitdecision-makinghavegainedsignificantattentionintheliterature.Thesemodels,firstintroducedbyJovanovic(1982),Hopenhayn(1992),EricsonandPakes(1995),andOlleyandPakes(1996)(Forrecentdevelopments,seeAbbringetal.(2018)andreferencestherein),examinehowfirmsmaximizetheirexpectednetpresentvalueoffutureprofitsbycompetingwithincumbentfirmsandpotentialentrantsinthefuture.Theentryandexitdecisionsmadebyfirmsdependontheirperceptionsoffuturemarketstructures,whicharebasedoncurrentinformation.Thesedecisionsultimatelyshapethefuturemarketstructures.EricsonandPakes(1995)establishedaMarkovperfectNashequilibriuminwhichfirms'perceptionsofthedistributionoffuturemarketstructuresalignwiththeobjectivedistributionofmarketstructuresgeneratedbythefirms'choices.OHeyandPakes(1996)describetheendogenousexitruleimpliedbytheirdynamicoligopolymodelasfollows:uafirmcomparesthesell-offvalueofitsplanttotheexpecteddiscountedreturnsofstayinginbusiness.Ifthecurrentstatevariablesindicatecontinuinginoperationisnotworthwhile,thefirmclosesdowntheplant."(p.1273).Inotherwords,marketexitoccursasavoluntaryliquidationdecisionasthefirmupdatesitsperceptionsoffutureprofits.Inreality,marketexitoftenoccursinvoluntarilythroughbankruptcy.MurtoandTervio(2014)addressthispossibilitybyintroducingamodelthatincludesforcedexitduetoliquidityconstraints.Inthismodel,firmsmaybeforcedtoexitthemarketduetoalackofliquidity,evenifitwouldstillbeprofitabletostayinbusiness.Therefore,thefirmmustoptimallymanageitscashreservestocopewiththeliquidityconstraint.Theyshowthattheequilibriumstateofthemarketmayresultineithertoomuchortoolittleexitdepen